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A Peircean ontology of language
Janos Sarbo and Jozsef Farkas
U niversity  of N ijm egen, T he  N etherlands 
ja n o s S c s .k u n .n l
A b s t r a c t .  Form al m odels of n a tu ra l language often  suffer from  exces­
sive com plexity. A reason for th is , we th in k , m ay be  due to  th e  underly ing  
approach  itself. In  th is  p ap er we in troduce  a  novel, sem iotic based  m odel 
of language w hich provides us w ith  a  sim ple a lgo rithm  for language pro­
cessing.
1 Introduction
Formal models of natural language often suffer from excessive complexity which, 
in our opinion, may be due to  the underlying approach itself. Their formal char­
acter implies th a t they are doomed to  reflect what is ‘natura l’ in language in an 
ad hoc fashion only.
In this paper we introduce -  on the bias of logic -  an alternative model 
of language which is built on the assumptions th a t (1) language symbols are 
signs, (2) the meaning of a sign emerges via mediation, and (3) signs arise from 
a diehotomous relation of perceived qualities. We argue th a t on the basis of 
these assumptions and the properties of signs, a simple parsing algorithm can 
be defined.
2 Sign and perception
In our analysis we follow the principles of Peirce’s semiotic ([5], [7]). Accord­
ingly, a sign signifies its object to  an agent in some sense, which is called the 
interpretant of the sign. The inseparable relation of sign, object and interpretant 
(each of which is a sign, recursively) is called the triadic relation of sign. In this 
paper we start from the observation th a t the ground for any sign is a contrast in 
the ‘real’ world. Because sign and object are the primary representation of such 
contrast, sign and object must be differ from each other.
How can we know about signs? We have discussed this problem in [3] and 
here we will only recapitulate the main results. Following cognition theory ([4]), 
the recognition of any sign must begin with the sensation of the physical input. 
Physical stimuli enter the human receiver via the senses which transform the 
raw data into internal sensation continuously. The output of the senses, a bio­
electric signal, is processed by the brain in percepts. The generation of such a 
percept is triggered by a change in the input, typically, or by the duration of 
some sampling time, e.g. in the case of visual perception.
The brain compares the current percept with the previous one, and this 
enables it to  distinguish between two sorts of input qualities: one, which was 
there and remained there, something stable, which we will call a continuant; 
and another, which, though it was not there, is there now (or the other way 
round), something changing, which we will call an occurrent. The collections of 
continuants and occurrents, which are inherently related to  each other, form the 
basis for our perception of a phenomenon as a sign. We also assume that, by 
means of selective attention , we recognise in these collections coherent sets of 
qualities: the qualities of the observed and those of the complementary part of 
the phenomenon. We will refer to  these sets collectively as the input.
2.1  T h e  v a r ie ty  o f  s ig n s
In Peirce’s view, the most complete signs are the icon, index, and symbol which 
represent their object on the basis of, respectively, similarity, causality and ar­
bitrary consensus. Besides this taxonomy, Peirce also distinguishes signs, re­
spectively, according to  the categorical status of the sign, and according to  the 
relationship between object and interpretant. From a categorical perspective, 
signs can be qualisigns, sinsigns or legisigns, which correspond, respectively, to 
firstness, secondness and thirdness. In other words, a sign can be a quality, an 
actual event, or a rule. Seen from the perspective of the relationship between 
object and interpretant, a sign may be a rheme, a dicent or an argument. In 
other words a sign may signify a qualitative possibility, an actual existence, or 
a proposition. Thus we obtain nine kinds of sign which may be arranged in a 
m atrix as shown in fig. 1 (the meaning of the horizontal lines and directed edges 
will be explained later). Although Peirce defined more complex systems of signs, 
we hold th a t his ’simple’ classification is the most practical.
Here, the expressions ‘class of a sign’ or ‘type of a sign’ will be used inter­
changeably. In our specification of logical and language signs we will make use of 
Peirce’s classes. A comparison between our use of them  and his definitions may 
be found in ([3]).
Phenome­
nological
type indexicality
(secondness)
mediation
(thirdness)
formal
(thirdness)
relational
Onto­
logical
type
quality
(firstness)
(secondness)
icon sinsign
qualisign
F ig .  1 . P eirce’s classification of signs
3 Logic and semiosis
We argue th a t semiosis begins with our experience of the input collections (which 
are qualities themselves) as signs. Such signs, which are called in Peirce’s term i­
nology a qualisign, are special signs for which we have no denotation. Although 
qualisigns are coherent, by definition, we experience them as independent signs. 
In order to  be able to refer to  the qualisigns, we will make use of logical symbols 
which are the most general of th a t type of sign. Logical symbols are signs from 
the logical point of view ([2]). We will represent such signs as logical functions 
on two variables A  and B , respectively, for the continuants and the occurrents, 
over two values 0 and 1, for the complementary and the observed part.
How do complex signs emerge? Again, we refer to  [3] where we introduced 
a semiotic model of signs and elaborated it for logical signs. Briefly, th a t model 
is based on a process in which trichotomic relations are generated recursively 
revealing gradually more accurate and clear approximations of the full richness 
of a sign of an observed phenomenon. Accordingly, in this paper we argue th a t the 
proposition of the input as a sign arises from the input qualisigns via a number 
of signs. By virtue of the fast and continuous nature of cognition we may assume 
th a t such signs are not recognised isolatedly, but only as ‘tem porary’ signs. Such 
signs, which are approximations of the final assertion, are re-presentations of the 
input qualisigns. Their classes are identical to  those defined by Peirce. We will 
argue th a t language is based on a similar mechanism.
The qualisigns form the ground for our semiosis. Because such signs are 
perceived as independent signs, but it is their unity th a t signifies the contrast 
as a whole, we may assume th a t there exists a need for the representation of the 
full richness of the relation of the qualisigns, eventually as a proposition. We will 
argue th a t this ‘representational need’ also appears in language in the form of 
the relational need of symbols.
The sign mediates between object and interpretant. In the case of logical 
signs, the interpretant is defined as the application of sign to  object, both of 
which are logical functions. Here, the notion ‘application’ is used in a broad 
sense. In the particular case we allow th a t sign and object ‘merge’ as a result 
of such operation. Therefore, this form of semiosis will be called an interaction-, 
sign and object will be referred to  as its constituents.
A derivation of those ‘tem porary’ signs, and, eventually, the proposition of 
the input as a sign proceeds as follows ([3]). We denote the signs of the collections 
of the observed part by the functions A  and B  (and those of the complementary 
part as -¡A and ^ B ) .  These collections are similar to  the input and appear 
simultaneously, by definition. Something which is similar to  something else can 
be a sign of it (icon). Such a sign, A or B , must refer to  an object which includes 
both A and B  (sinsign). The interpretant of such a sign and object can refer 
either to  their common origin (via the complementary signs), which is called the 
context (index), or, to  their relative difference. The latter provides us with a 
representation of the input collections independent of each other, the ‘abstract’ 
continuants (rheme), and how they co-occur, the ‘abstract’ occurrents (legisign).
The index can be represented by the Shaffer and Peirce functions, the rheme and 
the legisign, respectively, by the inhibition and exclusive-or functions.
The application of the index to  the rheme and to the legisign yields the 
complementation of those abstract signs by the context, i.e. the actual con­
stituent ‘parts’ of the input (dicent), and, the ‘property’ characterising their 
co-occurrence (symbol). Dicent and symbol can be represented, respectively, by 
the implication and the equivalence functions. Finally, by merging this property 
(as sign) with the sign of those actual parts (as object) we get a proposition of 
the input as a sign (argument) which can be represented by a syllogism (degen­
erately).
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F ig .  2 . T he  classification of logical signs
B
The logical representation of the qualisign can be completed with two more 
functions: 0 (‘not valid input’), and 1 (‘valid input’). As a result, we can conclude 
th a t in the semiosis of logical signs all Boolean functions (on two variables) can 
emerge. The resulting classification is depicted in fig. 2 (on the left-hand side).
Notice th a t in the derivations of the logical signs the interprétant always 
emerges from neighbouring sign and object (in the sense of the triadic relation). 
Such signs are connected in fig. 1 by a horizontal line. By virtue of the fundamen­
ta l character of logic it may be conceived th a t semiosis can always be explained 
in a similar vein.
4 Language
We will argue th a t language is logic, sequentially. In this section we will show 
th a t by means of this single condition a model of language can be derived which 
is isomorphic to  the one of logic. Language signs are symbols which are subject 
to  syntactic and semantic rules. In this paper we will consider only syntactic 
rules, and restrict language to  syntax ([6]).
‘Sequential’ means th a t the input signs appear one after the other as qual- 
isigns. Earlier we have pointed out th a t the qualisigns are the (first) represen­
tation of a contrast. In our cognitive model we defined such a contrast between 
continuant and occurrent. Because language symbols are about ‘real’ world phe­
nomena (typically), we may assume th a t an underlying contrast, analogous to 
the one of cognition, does exist in language, too. The language equivalent of 
continuant and occurrent is identified, respectively, in the aspects ‘thing’ and
‘change’, typically represented by nominals and verbs. Because language signs 
are inherently related to  memory, a ‘change’ can also refer to an ‘appearing’ 
new fact, which is a relative change of some thing or event (i.e. an alteration), 
typically represented by adjectives and adverbs.
In what follows, we will refer by a sign class to  the classification of syntactic 
symbols. In as much as the logical equivalent of the sign of a collection of ‘things’ 
and ‘changes’ must be the functions A  and B, respectively, we will use the logical 
and syntactic names of the qualisigns interchangeably.
4.1  A  p re lim in a ry  c la ssifica tio n
We will derive a model of language by transforming our specification of logical 
signs to  a sequential one. Such a derivation is partly technical. In order not to  get 
drown in the details, we make a preliminary attem pt at a semiotic classification 
of the main syntactic concepts.
The argument, which is a proposition, must correspond to  the notion of a 
sentence in as much as both are expressive of a statement. Hence, the dicent 
must be subject, and the symbol predicate. By virtue of its factual meaning (cf. 
‘modification’) the index can be an adjective, an adverb, or a complemented 
preposition (in short, prep-compl). A rheme is a possible for the subject, for 
example, a noun; a legisign is an actual event in the syntactic sense, th a t is, a 
‘structure’ event defined as a rule, e.g. a verb (-complement).
4 .2  T ow ards a  seq u en tia l v ers io n  o f  log ic
Qualisigns are the representation of a contrast. In the sequential case when 
each qualisign consists of a single symbol, also the contrast itself will appear 
sequentially. Accordingly, a qualisign will have either the aspect of a ‘thing’ 
(logically A), or a ‘change’ (logically B). From this it follows th a t in language 
we cannot distinguish between asserted and negated signs (at least not a t this 
level), and this implies th a t language phenomena must include their own context. 
Hence, a part of the input may have to  be devoted to  the representation of the 
context as a sign. Akin to  the general case of signs, we can have access to  memory 
knowledge, e.g. a lexicon, but such knowledge is not related to  the perceived 
input in any way.
Syntactic qualisigns consist of a single symbol and define a unique universe, 
therefore different qualisigns cannot be merged. Because input symbols appear 
continuously (i) ‘place ’ has to be created for the appearing next qualisign.
W hat can be done with the previous qualisign? The answer is simple, we 
have to  re-present it by another sign. Following our classification of logic, such 
a sign can be an icon or a sinsign.
We mentioned th a t in the case of language (ii) a qualisign is either A or B , 
but not both. Because a sinsign is a representation of an event, it must include 
the aspect of a ‘change’. Accordingly, the re-presentation of a qualisign which 
is B  can be a sinsign, hence the one which is A  must be an icon. Such a re­
presentation involves the generation of a new sign, the denotation of which is
identical to  the one of the qualisign. From the bottom-up ‘nature’ of our logical 
model it follows th a t the new sign will include the older one degenerately (in the 
semiotic sense).
Icon and sinsign are different representations of the same qualisigns. Because 
of (ii) and the uniqueness of signs1, it follows th a t icon and sinsign symbols typ­
ically will not be adjacent, therefore (iii) icon and sinsign implement a ‘sorting’ 
re-presentation of qualisigns. In particular, an icon and a sinsign can define a 
shared universe, for example, in the case of compound (multi-word) symbols, 
and idiomatic expressions.
By virtue of (i), we have to  represent the previous qualisign by a new sign, 
which is an icon or a sinsign. The appearance of this new sign, in turn , may 
force us to  do the same for the previous icon or sinsign and, eventually, signs 
may have to  be generated in any class. In sum, the conclusion can be drawn tha t 
in the sequential model of logic there is sign generation by need.
4 .3  S ig n  g e n e r a tio n  b y  n eed
The logical interpretant is defined as the application of sign to  object. In lan­
guage, such application will be called a ‘binding’. Due to  the sequential nature 
of language signs, we will also have to  consider two degenerate variants of such 
interaction which are the following.
a) Accumulation: in which case an existing sign is combined with another 
sign of the same type. Such an interaction assigns the same meaning to  both 
constituents thereby rendering them  indistinguishable.
b) Coercion: in which case a new sign is generated for the denotation of an 
existing sign (which is said ‘coerced’). Coercion applies if the signs, which are 
to  interact, are incapable for accumulation or binding.
Accumulation is possible in any class, except for the qualisign. For example, 
a series of adjectives can be merged to  a single sign via accumulation. Coercion 
is applicable in any class, except for the argument. In this form of an interaction 
we refer by the ‘constituent’ to  the sign triggering the interaction.
Coercions play an im portant role in syntactic sign recognition, more specif­
ically, in what we call as, the default scheme. This type of semiosis can be 
characterised as follows. By virtue of (i), signs are generated by need. The coer­
cion of a qualisign, A  or B , yields either an icon or a sinsign. Due to  subsequent 
applications of (i), such an icon or sinsign is coerced, respectively, to  a rheme 
or a legisign, and eventually to  a dicent or a symbol. An index cannot emerge 
this way, because there are no negated signs (so far). By virtue of the appearing 
different kinds of qualisigns, in the end, we may have a dicent and a symbol sign 
which are adjacent and generate the argument sign (the sentence as a sign).
Notice th a t also a dicent or a symbol can be coerced to  an argument, but 
such a sign will be a degenerate one, semiotieally, because an argument must
1 Lexical am bigu ity  of a  sym bol is tr e a te d  by in troducing  a  un ique d en o ta tio n  for each 
m eaning.
represent the observed phenomenon in its character ([5]) and has to  include both 
A  and B. Such signs of the input as a whole, are the dicent and the symbol signs.
In as much as the argument arises from dicent and symbol (subject and 
predicate), we may conclude that, in the default case, only subject and predicate 
are recognised and their relation represented as a sentence. It will be argued tha t 
language sign recognition always follows this scheme and any deviation from it 
may only occur if otherwise a successful parse cannot be found. Such a case will 
be described in the next section.
4 .4  T h e  g en es is  o f  th e  co n te x t
In language we are burdened by the task of the recognition of the entire string of 
input symbols as a single sign. Although, in some cases, the sign generation op­
erations (coercion, accumulation and binding) may be unsatisfactory, the above 
goal can yet be achieved if we allow for a sign, which is potentially subject or 
predicate, to  be represented degenerately (in the semiotic sense). Such signs de­
fine, what we called as, the context. The degenerate representation of symbols 
also plays an im portant role in the ‘stepwise’ construction of signs.
Sign degeneration (J.) can be explicated by the phenomenological and on­
tological types of signs indicated in fig. 1 as follows: dicentjindex if subject 
meaning is not present ‘formally’; symboljindex if predicate meaning is not 
present ‘mediationally’; dicentj-rheme if subject meaning is unfinished ‘index- 
ieally’; symbolj-legisign if predicate meaning is unfinished ‘relationally’.
Sample context signs are, for example, dicentjindex in Mary, John likes (the 
potential subject Mary becomes a context sign for likes); symboljindex in Mary 
with flowers (the potential property with flowers is represented degenerately as a 
context sign for Mary).
The existence of degenerate signs is related to  our ability of analysing a 
segment of input symbols (nested input) independently from the rest of the 
input. When such a segment is recognised, its meaning relative to  the input as 
a whole is represented degenerately. Because of this degeneration such a symbol 
will not appear as an isolatedly recognised sign. The semiosis of such nested signs 
is implemented by a recursive application of the sign recognition ‘machinery’ (for 
example, in the case of coordination, subordination etc.).
In certain cases we can know in advance if a sign eventually will become a 
context sign. If a nested sign consists of a single input symbol, the recursive anal­
ysis may be replaced by a coercion. For example, an index sign can be directly 
generated by coercion from such an icon or sinsign. This kind of optimisation 
is typical for adjective, adverb and prep-compl symbols and it is lexically spec­
ified as their syntactic property. The ‘stepwise’ construction of a sign can be 
optimised by the immediate generation of the degenerate representation of the 
interpretant. For example, the interaction of such rheme and index can be di­
rectly represented as a rheme or an index sign, without explicitly generating its 
meaning as a dicent sign.
The representation of logical signs in the sequential case is depicted in fig. 2 
(on the right-hand side). Although the same denotations, A  and B, appear many
times, each of the occurrences has a different meaning. A language implementa­
tion of these signs involves the mapping of the logical functions to  their syntactic 
equivalent. The definition of such a mapping is the subject of the next section.
4 .5  R e la t io n a l n eed
The requirement th a t all symbols have to  be ‘merged’ to  a single sign and sin­
gle universe is in conflict with their individual character and unique universe 
property. How can such symbols be combined?
An answer can be found in the properties of syntactic qualisigns. Such sym­
bols are representations of one ‘half’ of a contrast. Because we can only reason 
about a contrast if both of its ‘parts’ are known, syntactic symbols can be said 
to  be ‘longing’ for finding their complementary part. This inherent property of 
syntactic symbols is the language equivalent of the ‘representational need’ of 
signs introduced in sect. 3. This interaction ‘potential’ forms the ground of the 
relational properties of syntactic signs. In as much as the ‘parts’ of a contrast are 
different, syntactic sign interactions always arise between symbols of a different 
type of relational properties.
If, as we argued, logical and language signs are analogous, this must also 
apply to  syntactic symbols. We map continuant and occurrent (via ‘thing’ and 
‘change’), respectively, to  the relational types ‘passive’ (p) and ‘active’ (a). For­
mally, we define the type ‘neutral’ (n). The logical qualisigns, A  and II. are 
mapped to  a syntactic relational need, or valency, represented as a pair consist­
ing of a relational type and a set of relational qualities (or, syntactic properties). 
In this paper it will be assumed th a t the set of such qualities is finite.
Because any sign is a re-presentation of the qualisigns, the relational qualities 
may contribute to  different relational properties in each class. These qualities, 
which are lexically defined, will be om itted in the specification. Accordingly, we 
will refer to  the relational need of any sign by its type only (and call it an a-, p­
and n-need, ambiguously). A sign, which has an n-need, is finished (relationally). 
Such a sign cannot take part in any interaction, except for a coercion and, vice 
versa, only such a sign can be subject to  a coercion (typically).
The above mapping defines an initial representation of the relational need 
of signs in the various classes. By virtue of the properties of logical signs, this 
mapping has to  be further developed as follows. Notice th a t each modification 
amounts to  an adjustment of the definition of the qualisigns.
We introduce an n-need in the qualisign, icon, sinsign and argument classes. 
Indeed, qualisigns are independent signs which cannot interact; icon and sinsign 
symbols typically do not establish a relation; and finally, the argument which is 
the sentence as a sign, must be ‘complete’ (and neutral, relationally). Because 
icon, index and symbol do function as sign, in the sense of the triadic relation, 
we introduce an (optional) p-need for each class which functions as object (e.g. 
for the legisign class). Finally, when sign and object, respectively, are initially 
assigned to  a p- and an a-need, their relational needs are exchanged in the 
mapping. The reason for this modification can be explained as follows.
The predicate of the sentence can arise from a legisign (a verb) via the com­
plementation of an index. Traditionally, such complement is lexically specified 
in the verb’s entry. Semiotieally, however, it is the complement th a t points to 
the verb and selects its actual meaning. This interpretation is conform with the 
default scheme of sign recognition, according to  which, verbs only function as a 
sign in the predication symbol interaction. Because also adjectives, adverbs etc. 
function as sign (in the sense of the triadic relation), in our model of language 
the concept of ‘modifier’ and ‘complement’ amalgamate.
In sum, the relational need of a qualisign can be defined as a set, an element 
of which is a reference to  a class in which the qualities of the input symbol can 
contribute to  a relational need (of a sign) via re-presentation. For example, the 
valency of a transitive verb can be defined as {legisign,symbol} referring to  an 
a-need, respectively, for the complement and the subject. A p-need, which is 
optional (typically) is om itted (also in the examples).
We demand th a t a relational need is always satisfied. In particular, a binding 
satisfies a pair of a- and a p-needs by resolving them; an accumulation merges a 
pair of needs to  a single one; a sign generated by coercion inherits the valency 
of the sign coerced. In as much as a p-need is optional, when such a need is not 
present, it is equivalent to  an n-need.
Because the index sign does not partake in the default scheme of syntactic 
sign recognition, the generation of such signs is subject to  special conditions. 
We demand th a t a symbol can become an index having a p-need, either if any 
other analysis of th a t symbol eventually fails, or, if there is an existing a-need 
of a symbol in the legisign class.
4 .6  A  P e ircea n  m o d e l o f  lan gu age
In this section we will specify language signs and their valency. Instead of using 
a set representation, we directly refer to  the classes of fig. 1. W ith respect to  the 
lexical denotation of language signs we will refer to  the types of speech.
Syntactic qualisigns are defined as follows: 4=noun; _B=verb, adjective, ad­
verb, prep(-eompl), where ‘eompl’ can be a noun, verb, adjective or adverb. 
Formally, we also define 0 = ‘no input’ and l = ‘end of input’. The latter can rep­
resent the ‘dot’ symbol which is considered an A and B  sign, having an a-need in 
any class, but incompatible with any sign except for itself. Hence, the dot symbol 
is capable of ‘forcing’ the realisation of pending interactions. In the examples we 
will assume th a t the input is closed by a finite number of dots. The specification 
is depicted in fig. 3 (on the left-hand side). An occurrence of a p-need may also 
denote an n-need, except for the dicent sign class (cf. subject).
4 .7  M o rp h o lo g y
We argue th a t morphology can be modelled analogously to  syntax and logic. Due 
to  space, we can only run through the essential ideas behind such a specification. 
We characterise morphological symbols as follows (now we refer by a sign class 
to  the Peircean classification of morphological signs).
Dieent and symbol signs are finished morphologically and represent only a 
sorting of signs. This is justified by the different syntactic properties of the 
signs of these classes. A symbol, for example, an adjective, is a sign which, 
syntactically, requires a complement adjacent to  it in the input (on ‘surface’ 
level). A dicent, for example, a noun or a verb, does not have such a property.
Rheme, index and legisign, respectively, represent a qualitative possibility, a 
factuality (e.g. definiteness), and something rule-like (e.g. argument-structure). 
These signs are involved in the creation of the syntactic relational needs, passive 
and active (N.B. such a need should not be mixed up with the signs’ morphologi­
cal valency which, akin to  syntax, determine the morphological sign interactions). 
Finally, icon and sinsign are either sorting, alike to  syntax, or, when they are 
adjacent, are generating a new syntactic property, e.g. an adjective from a verb 
(such signs represent the same phenomenon and have a shared universe).
Morphological signs and their morphological relational needs are displayed 
in fig. 3 (on the right-hand side). The dicent sign is defined as a coerced rheme, 
or a rheme-index interaction, whereas the symbol as a coerced legisign, or an 
index-legisign interaction. The morphological argument sign coincides with the 
syntactic qualisign.
sentence /  \
(p)noun (a)verb
(p) noun
(p)noun (a,p)verb
prep-compl (a)prep(-compl)
(p)noun
qualisign
(n,a)adj,adv,verb,
prep(-compl)
argument /  \
(n)dicent (n)symbol
(p)noun
verb
(p)noun,adj,adv
(a)article,particle, 
„ verb(aux)
(n)adj,adv
(a)prep
(p)noun,adj
adv,verb
(n,a)prep,article, 
particle, (a)affix
qualisign
F ig . 3 . C lassification of syn tac tic  a n d  m orphological sym bols
Morphological qualisigns are defined as follows: 4= noun, verb, adjective, 
adverb, coordinator; B=preposition, article, particle, affix. Formally, we also 
define 0 = ‘no input’ and l = ‘separation’. The latter can represent the ‘space’ 
symbol which is considered an A and B  sign, incompatible for any interaction, 
except for accumulation (with any sign triggering the interaction). Hence, the 
space symbol can ‘sweep’ out the morphologically finished signs. Dot symbols 
are treated similarly as in the case of syntax.
4 .8  F orm al d e fin itio n
We specify a recogniser for our model as a pushdown automaton. Formally, the 
autom aton is defined as a 8-tuple M  = (K , C, I ,  F, p, s , F, A ) where K  is a finite 
set of states, C  is a finite set of sign classes, I  is a finite set of input symbols, F  is 
a finite set of stack symbols, p is a function defining the relational need of input 
symbols, s is the initial state, F  C K  is a set of final states, _i is a transition 
relation consisting of is a finite set of transition rules.
A transition rule is a mapping (p, u, f3) —¥ (q, 7 ) where p ,q  € K  are, respec­
tively, the states before and after the transition, u £ I* are the symbols to  be 
read, and /?, 7  £ F* are the symbols to  be popped and pushed. There is a single 
transition rule for reading the next input symbol onto the stack, all other rules 
are ‘internal’ transition rules which operate only on the stack. Such rules will be 
used for the specification of the syntactic sign interactions as follows.
Because such rules always refer to  the set C, in the definitions we will replace 
p  and q by C, but we will specify only those classes of C  (by listing them) which 
are involved in the transition. A further simplification is possible due to  the 
observation th a t the stack is used in ‘frames’. Such a frame (j3) has a finite 
number of locations for each element of G. The first two of these locations 
will be called the next and the existing sign of a class, all others are tem porary 
locations. A tem porary location can be necessary, for example, for the evaluation 
of a condition. The specification of such computations may require a number of 
internal rules which we alternatively define as a (logical) expression. Accordingly, 
the tem porary locations are removed from the transition rules.
The value of a next and existing sign can be an input symbol (only in the 
qualisign class), or a relational need r  =  (t,y)  where t C C  and y is a finite set 
(of syntactic properties). The logical type of r  is defined by the function r  as 
follows: r (( t ,y ))  = A  if t = 0, and B , otherwise.
Nondeterminism is assumed to  be implemented by backtracking ([1]). In the 
definition of A  we will allow a reference to  the current value of the evaluation 
mode, forward(‘f ’) or baekward(‘b ’), via the function mode. Finally, we will 
make use of a graph G = (C , E) where E= E4U Eh, and E4, Eh C C  x  C  are, 
respectively, the set of directed edges and horizontal lines (undirected edges) as 
shown in fig. 1 (a formal definition is omitted). The successors and neighbours 
of a class are defined, respectively, by the functions succ(c) =  {c '|(c , c ') € E4} 
and adj(c) = {c'\(c,c') € Eh}. An element of succ(c) and adj(c) is denoted, 
respectively, as cs and ca.
In a transition rule, state and stack will be merged. The stack is read non­
destructively (7 =f3'f3 where f3' and f3 are, respectively, the next and the current 
frame). Because input symbols (u) are only related to  the qualisign class of C, 
the treatm ent of these symbols is specified by a separate rule (as mentioned 
earlier) in which u is defined to  appear in the next sign location of the qualisign 
class. In sum, we will refer to  triples (c, s, s') where c is a class, and s and s' are, 
respectively, its next and existing signs (any of s and s' may not be specified, in 
which case, it is denoted by a symbol). The triples on the left- and right-hand 
side of a rule, respectively, refer to  the current and next frame on the top of the 
stack. In the rules below (and also in the examples) the names of the sign classes 
are abbreviated; £ denotes the empty value.
i n p u t :
( q u a l , u , s ) —¥ (qual , e , p(u)) ■
(qua l , s ,r ) , ( i con, s , - )  —¥ (qual,  e ,e ) , (icon, r , _) IF  r ( r )  =  A.
(qual, s ,r ) ,  (sins,  e,_) —¥ (qual, s , s ) ,  (sins, r, _) IF  r( r)  = B.
The internal rules will be given by rule schemes for the class variable X  
(X € C\qualisign). The class of a symbol generated by binding is denoted 
as X b. Because of space, the specification of degeneration is om itted and X b 
is restricted to  X s (in general, X b € { X , X a, X s}). In virtue of the special 
conditions required by the index class, the triple corresponding to  the legisign 
class is explicitly defined in some of the rule schemes. We will make use of the 
functions cmpacc and cmpbind which, respectively, yield true if their arguments 
can syntactically accumulate and bind in the class specified. Furthermore, we 
will refer to  the functions acc, coerce and bind which, respectively, determine the 
relational need of the symbols yielded by accumulation, coercion and binding. 
The function condix checks if the special conditions of the index class hold.
accum ulation  :
(X,  r, r1) —¥ (X,  e, acc(X,  r, r' ))  IF  cmpacc(X,  r, r'). 
coercioni :
(X , r , r ') ,  ( * « ,  e, e), (X s , e, _), (legi, A) -»• (X , e, r ) ,  { X \  r c , _)
IF  {p, X }  i ' A -icmpacc(X , r , r ') A condix (X3, r c, A)
W H E R E  r c = coerce(X, r ' , X s), r' = (t ' , y '). 
coercion 2  :
( X ,e , r ' ) ,  ( X a, r a,s),  ( X s, s, _), (legi, A) -»• (X ,e , e), ( X a, e , r „ ) ,  ( X s,r% _) 
I F { p , X } ^ i '  A - cmpbind(X, r '  , X a,r'a) A cond ix(Xs , r c , A)
W H E R E  rc = coerce(X, r ' , X s), r' = (t ' , y ').
b inding  :
(X,  r, r'),  ( X a,e, r'a), ( X h,e,  _), {legi, A) -»• (X,  e, r), ( X a,e, e), ( X h, r h, _)
IF  (p € t' A X a € t'a) A cmpbind{X ,  r ' , X a , r'a) A condix(Xb, r h, A) 
W H E R E  rh = b m d ( X h,r>,r'a), r> =  (t ' , y '), r'a = (t'a,y'a). 
condix(X,  ( t ,y ) , ( t i ,y i ) )  :
X  = indx A ((p € t A (mode =  ‘b ’ V legi € ti)) V X  € t) V T R U E  .
A parser can be defined by using tem porary locations. Such a location may 
contain an input symbol, or, one or two constants which are used as pointers to 
locations of the previous frame.
4 .9  E x a m p le
In this section we show the analysis of the sentence Mary eats pizza with a fork. 
The sign m atrix will be represented in a tabular form. A column corresponds to 
a sign class, and a row to the recognition of an input symbol. The treatm ent of 
space and dot symbols is omitted. The final step of sign recognition (the gen­
eration of an argument sign) is not displayed. The accumulation of symbols is 
denoted by a “/ ” sign. Rule names are abbreviated as follows: input(i), accumu­
la tio n ^ ), coercei(ci), coerce2(c2) and binding(b); degeneration is indicated by 
a subscript ‘d ’.
The morphological analysis is depicted in table 1. In step 8, the index sign 
‘a ’ binds to  the rheme ‘fork’ and complements it with the property of ‘definite­
ness’. The morphological sign ‘a fork’ is represented degenerately as an index 
which, then, complements the legisign ‘w ith’. Their interaction yields the sign 
‘with a fork’ (a prep-compl) having adjective- or adverb-like syntactic properties.
Table 1. Morphological analysis
nr. qual icon sins rhm e indx legi den t sym b rule
0 M ary(M )
1 eat(e) M i, Cl
2 -s e M i, Cl, Cl
3 pizza(p) e -s M i, Cl
4 w ith(w ) P e-s M i, Cl, b, Cl
5 a(a) w P e-s i, Cl, Cl, Cl
6 fork(f) a P w e-s i, Cl, Cl
7 f a w P Cl, Cl, Cl, Cl
8 f a w P bd
9 a-f w P b, ci
1 0 w -a-f Cl
The final output is (Mary) (eats) (pizza) (with a fork) where an item enclosed in 
parentheses denotes an argument sign generated.
For the syntactic analysis, the relational needs are defined as follows: ‘eats’=  
{legisign,symbol}, ‘with a fork’={index}. The parses are displayed in table 2 and 
table 3 (in the latter only the steps deviating from the first analysis are given). 
Notice that, due to  the sequentiality of the model, the reference of a sign is fixed 
when the sign of its object appears.
T a b le  2 . S yntactic  analysis (a lte rn a tiv e  # 1 )
nr. qual icon sins rhm e indx legi den t sym b rule
0
1
M ary(M )
eats(e) M
i
i, Cl
2 pizza(p) e M i, Cl, C2
3 w ith  a  fo rk(w af) P M e i, Cl, C2
4 Waf M P e Cl, b d
5 M Waf e-p Cl
6 Waf e-p M b
7 M e-p-Waf b
Because a prep(-eompl) can have an a-need in the legisign class (but only if 
it is accumulated with a verb), there is a third analysis possible, in which, eats 
and with a fork combine to  a single legisign representing a common meaning, e.g. 
‘with-a-fork-eating’. This analysis (‘with a fork’={legisign}) is shown in table 4.
Table 3. Syntactic analysis (alternative # 2 )
nr. qual icon sins rhm e indx legi dent symb rule
3’ w ith a fork(waf) P M e i, C2, Cl
4’ Waf P e M Cl
5’ P Waf e M bd
6’ P-Waf e M b
7’ M e-p-Waf b
T ab le 4 . Syntactic analysis (alternative # 3 )
nr. qual icon sins rhm e indx legi dent symb rule
3” with a fork (w af) P M e i, C2
4” Waf M P e ci, a
5” M P e/w af Cl
6” P e/w af M b
7” M e/w af-p b
F u rth er  research
The simplicity of the algorithm introduced in the paper allows the generation of
efficient parsers. In virtue of the simple ‘structure’ of its syntactic (and logical)
analyses, such parsers can be particularly suitable for text summarisation and
for handling incomplete sentences.
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